Juror Competency to Testify That a Verdict Was the Product of Racial Bias by Gold, Victor
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 9 
Issue 1 Volume 9, Fall 1993, Issue 1 Article 7 
September 1993 
Juror Competency to Testify That a Verdict Was the Product of 
Racial Bias 
Victor Gold 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Gold, Victor (1993) "Juror Competency to Testify That a Verdict Was the Product of Racial Bias," Journal 
of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol9/iss1/7 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an 
authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
JUROR COMPETENCY TO TESTIFY
THAT A VERDICT WAS THE PRODUCT
OF RACIAL BIAS
VICTOR GOLD*
Recent trials involving racial incidents have made it increas-
ingly difficult to distinguish between those judicial proceedings
and the conflict being waged on the streets. Verdicts, sentences,
and even seemingly innocuous procedural nuances have inflamed
passions, occasionally resulting in destructive civil unrest.' Ac-
tions by the trial courts in such cases may have exacerbated racist
attitudes or otherwise undermined respect for the law. These ef-
fects extend far beyond the community in which the trial occurs.
Media attention and the resultant public scrutiny transformed
certain trials into political and social events of national impor-
tance. Consequently, trial courts have been thrust into the center
of society's racial problems.
It is essential, to both the rule of law and the independence of
the judiciary, that in racially sensitive cases the result is not dic-
tated by its perceived political or social acceptability.2 A judgment
motivated by concern over potential civil unrest is as objectionable
as a judgment motivated by racial bias. But while results should
not be dictated by racial concerns, process sometimes should be
influenced by them. In cases involving racial issues, the use of
more racially sensitive procedures could make a marked differ-
ence in how an otherwise unpopular result is received by both the
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. B.A., J.D., U.C.L.A.
The author wishes to thank David Leonard for his comments. This essay further develops
ideas first presented by the author in 27 C.A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE (1990).
1 See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Riots in Los Angeles: Around the Nation; From Coast to
Coast, Cities are Struggling to Control a Swell of Violence, N.Y. TImEs, May 2, 1992, at 10
(reporting on massive, large-scale rioting occurring in wake of acquittal of four white police
officers accused in beating of black motorist, Rodney King).
2 See Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19, 22-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). It was error to
refuse a change of venue when the jurors were under great social pressure to convict. Id. at
23. In Lozano, the court held that determination of guilt or innocence must be based solely
upon the evidence presented. Id. at 23.
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parties and the community.' If procedures are in fact fair and do
not bias the decisionmaking process, neither judicial indepen-
dence nor the rule of law will be jeopardized by conducting a trial
in a racially sensitive manner.
Within these parameters, the law of evidence should be con-
cerned with racial sensibilities. This does not mean that there
should be one set of rules for cases involving racial matters and
another set for all other cases. It also does not suggest that evi-
dence law should always avoid irritating those sensibilities. It
means only that, where the values underlying the law of evidence
can be accommodated with a racially sensitive approach, the so-
cial benefits suggest that the courts should embrace that
approach.
Generally, this requires no departure from business as usual;
evidence law is virtually color blind and rarely directly implicates
racial matters. But there is at least one exception. Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b) ("Rule 606(b)") states: "Upon an inquiry into
the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror...." This Rule
has repeatedly been held to preclude a juror from testifying, in
support of a motion for a new trial, that juror conduct during de-
liberations suggests the verdict was tainted by racial bias.
This Essay suggests that such testimony should not be excluded
under Rule 606(b). Part One describes the Rule and the cases that
have precluded juror testimony concerning evidence of racial bias.
Part Two analyzes the policies underlying the Rule. Finally, Part
Three proposes a manner of interpreting Rule 606(b) consistent
with these policies and the language of the Rule. This interpreta-
tion suggests juror testimony concerning racial bias on the jury
should be admissible under Rule 606(b).
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW UNDER RULE 606(b)
There are three basic components to the principle of witness dis-
3 See M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional Prescription for
Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REV. 1855 passim (1993)
(discussing various procedural alternatives used to achieve racial fairness in wake of Los
Angeles riots).
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qualification contained in Rule 606(b). 4 First, the principle applies
only in a specific procedural context: "an inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment."5 Second, the provision lists the forms
of evidence barred: testimony, affidavit, or any statement of a ju-
ror.6 Third, the exclusionary principle applies only to evidence on
certain specified subjects: (1) "any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations"'; (2) "the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influ-
encing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indict-
ment""; or (3) "the juror's mental processes in connection there-
with."9 Disqualification follows under these circumstances unless
an exception applies. Rule 606(b) creates two exceptions, permit-
ting testimony "on the question whether extraneous prejudicial in-
formation was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror."10
On its face, Rule 606(b) appears to make jurors incompetent to
testify as to the effect of any sort of bias on the jury since such
testimony would disclose the jury's mental or emotional processes.
Most authorities agree with this interpretation, maintaining that
the Rule precludes a juror from testifying that issues in a case
were prejudged" and that a juror was motivated by irrelevant or
improper personal considerations. 12 In addition, substantial au-
4 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). This rule provides in relevant part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as
to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to
the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the ques-
tion whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning
a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 FED. R. EVID. 606(B).
10 Id.
11 See Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1985). A juror stated on voir dire
that, based upon pretrial publicity, she thought the defendant was guilty, but believed she
could put aside her preconceived notions. Id. Rule 606(b) was held to preclude a juror from
later stating she had been unable to put those notions aside and that, in fact, her decision
was based on her original bias. Id.
12 See United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Although the jury is
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thority supports the proposition that Rule 606(b) precludes admis-
sion of juror testimony concerning statements or conduct of jurors
during deliberations that suggest their verdict was animated by
racial bias. For example, in applying Rule 606(b) courts have re-
jected the following evidence: a juror stated during deliberations
that a party "should be taught a lesson" for hiring Mexican nation-
als holding green cards;' 3 eleven white jurors racially intimidated
a lone black juror;'4 a juror, describing a defendant charged with
soliciting prostitutes, said during deliberations: "Let's be logical.
He's black and he sees a seventeen-year-old white girl. I know the
type;"' 5 during deliberations a juror strutted like a minstrel and
mimicked a black dialect because the defendant and his attorney
were black;16 and jurors, who were Native Americans, used racial
comments to pressure another juror to vote guilty in a case involv-
ing theft of horses from other Native Americans. 7 It is not diffi-
cult to imagine how a similar ruling in a widely publicized case
could exacerbate racial tensions and undermine popular respect
for the law.
Commentators seem to agree that these results are mandated
by Rule 606(b).'I While substantial authority suggests that consti-
tutional issues are raised when Rule 606(b) is applied in this man-
ner, there is little dissent from the proposition that the provision
compels such results.' 9 However, a detailed analysis of the poli-
obligated to decide the case solely on the evidence, its verdict may not be disturbed if it is
later learned that personal prejudices were not put aside during deliberations."); see also
Johnson v. Knapp, 74 F.R.D. 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court may not consider evidence
that juror developed romantic infatuation with one of lawyers during trial).
13 Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1981).
14 Dunkins v. State, 838 S.W.2d 898, 900-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); cf Johnson v.
Hunter, 144 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1944) (decided prior to enactment of Federal Rules of
Evidence).
15 Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1987).
16 Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 488 (S.D. Iowa), affd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
17 State v. Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167, 169 (S.D. 1983).
18 See 3 DAVID LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 287, at 131-32
(1979). "Serious and sensitive problems may arise if it can be made to appear that a verdict
was the product of egregious racial or ethnic prejudice .... Clearly the counsel of the Rule,
however, is to be conservative in the approach to such problems and to err upon the side of
exclusion rather than receipt of evidence in close cases." Id.; see also 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 606(04), at 606-42 to -43 (1987). "But
what should be done in terms of Rule 606(b) if a juror has... commented adversely on the
religion or nationality of a witness ... and proof of these statements is offered on a motion
for a new trial?... Generally, it seems better to draw [the line] in favor ofjuror privacy; in
the heat of juror debate all kinds of statements may be made which have little effect on
outcome, though taken out of context they seem damning and absurd." Id.
19 But see Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). In Tobias, a bur-
[Vol. 9:125
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cies underlying the Rule questions the continued viability of this
conclusion.
II. THE POLICIES OF RULE 606(b)
The common-law rule precluding a juror from impeaching her
verdict was first justified as a means of preventing fraud.20 The
concern was that, if a juror could testify as to jury misconduct, the
juror might be able to perpetrate fraud in two ways. First, the
juror might intentionally induce the rest of the jury to engage in
misconduct, such as deciding the case by flipping a coin. This
would enable that same juror to later impeach the verdict by testi-
fying as to the jury's misconduct. 21 The juror might employ this
strategy when it appeared that the jury otherwise would return a
verdict which she did not favor. Second, the juror might falsely
testify that she concurred in a verdict due to bias, mistake, or
other improper motive.22 The policy of averting these fraudulent
acts has sometimes been described in terms of eliminating the in-
centive for jury tampering. This is because it is assumed that a
juror will rarely develop the desire to engage in fraud without an
incentive from some outside source.23
The threat of fraud does not satisfactorily explain or justify Rule
glary prosecution, a juror submitted an affidavit to the court which stated that the jury
foreman said: "You can't tell one black from another" and a second juror said the jury
should take the word of the white victims over the black defendant. Id. The court ruled that
the affidavit may be received under Rule 606(b) since "the statements in the juror's affida-
vit are sufficient to raise a question as to whether the jury's verdict was discolored by im-
proper influences." Id. See State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d 686, 700 (Wis. 1984) (Steinmetz,
J., concurring) ("It is not necessary that a source which is foreign to the jurors make the
prejudicial remarks in order for it to be an outside influence."); Robert E. Schumaker, Note,
Racial Slurs by Jurors as Grounds for Impeaching a Jury's Verdict: State v. Shillcutt, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 1481, 1515-18 (1985) (proposing Rule 606(b) be amended to provide for circum-
stances under which weight of evidence of racial prejudice demonstrates violation of consti-
tutional due process protections).
20 Owen v. Warburton, 127 Eng. Rep. 489, 491 (1805).
21 See In re Beverly Hills Fire, 695 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1982). "[Rule 606(b)] guaran-
tees that jurors cannot manipulate the system when their views are in the minority by
repudiating an earlier verdict and obtaining a mistrial." Id.
22 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 140 (1892). "Public policy forbids that a
matter resting in the personal consciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow
the verdict, because being personal, it is not accessible to other testimony. It gives the
secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve." Id.; see also
United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1976). "A central purpose of the rule
of juror incompetency is the prevention of fraud by individual jurors who could remain
silent during deliberations and later assert that they were influenced by improper consid-
erations." Id.
23 See Mattox, 146 U.S. at 148; Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140,
148 (3d Cir. 1975).
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606(b). As to the first type of fraud described in the preceding par-
agraph, it seems unlikely that the problem would occur with any
reasonable frequency even in the absence of any limits on the com-
petency of jurors to testify. The prospect of testifying under oath
in court is usually a disincentive to fraud, not an invitation.
Rather than discourage fraud, it seems likely that declaring jurors
incompetent to testify would promote fraud because it disqualifies
the very individuals who could testify as to the involvement of
fraud in inducing a verdict. The second type of fraud is arguably a
more plausible threat. The potential exists for a juror to falsely
allege that she acted with improper motives without any fear that
her testimony will be successfully challenged in court. She is the
only witness to her own thoughts. However, this would only jus-
tify a Rule which precludes a juror from testifying to her own
mental process or emotional reactions and, in fact, the original
version of Rule 606(b) was limited to such testimony.24 But the
Rule as enacted goes further, precluding testimony as to state-
ments made by other jurors during deliberations and other objec-
tively apparent facts or events. In the cases excluding evidence of
racial bias on the jury, that evidence has referred to just such
statements, facts, or events.
An additional policy argument frequently advanced in support
of the Rule preventing jurors from impeaching their verdict is
based on concern that counsel will harass jurors after a verdict is
returned. The concern is that losing counsel will question jurors
as to the basis for their decision and pressure them to testify as to
possible errors.25 This would make jury service even more onerous
by prolonging the jury's connection with the case past trial and
into appeal.26 But again, this policy does not fully justify Rule
24 For a comparison with the preliminary draft of Rule 606(b), see 46 F.R.D. 161, 289-90
(1969).
25 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915). The court stated:
But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into
court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the
hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be
harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of
facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.
Id.
26 During the hearings conducted on Rule 606, the Justice Department suggested this
policy was particularly important. See H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (statement of
W. Vincent Rakeshaw, Assistant Attorney General). Mr. Rakeshaw commented:
Many grand and petit jurors serve at considerable personal sacrifice, and protection is
due them after their service so that they may not be pestered by investigators, disap-
[Vol. 9:125
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606(b). Essential parts of that provision are the exceptions for "ex-
traneous information" and "outside influence."27 These exceptions
are somewhat ambiguous and have provided losing counsel ample
room to fish for potentially admissible testimony concerning jury
misconduct.28 While a more carefully drafted statute might elimi-
nate some juror harassment, the amount of litigation arising
under the exceptions to Rule 606(b) suggests that provision has
not advanced, and does not focus upon, this policy goal.29
Restrictions on the competency of jurors to testify also have
been justified on the grounds that such restrictions advance the
value of finality and stability of verdicts.3 It is unquestionably
true that a law that makes a juror incompetent to impeach her
verdict enhances finality and certainty. It is also unquestionably
true that finality and certainty are process values important to
any system of justice. 3' These values are particularly important to
the jury system since there are probably few, if any, verdicts to-
tally uninfluenced by bias or untainted by some sort of improper
conduct.32 But it is also clear that the values of finality and cer-
pointed suitors, or others, whether looking for grounds for a new trial or reacting to the
contentions of some one of the jurors, nor should the law tolerate jurors being pitted
against each other in post-trial litigation.
Id.
27 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
28 See Peter N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process-Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J. 1187, 1224 (1985).
[S]ince the competency rule has numerous exceptions, and in criminal cases inquiries
into constitutional violations might be appropriate despite the language of the rule, the
rule does not eliminate the need for the conscientious lawyer to interview jurors to
assess whether the jurors have committed misconduct and whether this particular
type of misconduct is susceptible to juror testimony.
Id.
29 Any rule of partial juror incompetency will inevitably leave some room for juror har-
assment. But since jury misconduct may inflict serious injustice, some harassment to un-
cover that injustice may be justifiable. Perhaps the most sensible way to deal with abusive
and unnecessary harassment is through the rules of ethics, with appropriate professional
disciplinary sanctions to support those rules, and the exercise ofjudicial controls over post-
verdict contact between counsel and jurors.
30 See United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664 (2d Cir. 1978). "[Clertain limits on post-
trial inquiry into jury verdicts are necessary in the interest of finality lest judges 'become
Penelopes, forever engaged in unraveling the webs they wove.'" Id. (citing Jorgensen v.
York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947)); see also Sims' Crane Serv. v. Ideal
Steel Prod., Inc., 800 F.2d 1553, 1556 n.9 (11th Cir. 1986). "The effect of Rule 606(b) is, in
some instances, to place greater weight on finality than accuracy. While this policy decision
may be open to philosophical attack, any alteration is for those who create the rules and
not this court." Id.
31 The importance of finality in this context is, in theory, enhanced by the fact that the
verdict to be given final effect is the product of community values. Thus, finality and pri-
vacy are interrelated policy justifications for Rule 606(b). See infra notes 47-55.
32 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.19, at 377 (4th ed. 1992).
1993]
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tainty frequently compete in the law of evidence with concerns for
fairness and accuracy.33 An absolute rule of juror incompetency
would incorrectly presuppose that finality and certainty are al-
ways superior to such competing concerns. The legitimacy of our
jury system, at least in part, depends on the correctness of the
assumption that the jury system usually produces decisions based
on fair procedures, accurate fact-finding, and community values.34
In totalitarian states, process values of efficiency and economy al-
ways achieve ascendancy because the primary purpose of the legal
system is to maintain order. The legitimacy of the courts in such
states is not dependent upon accuracy or fairness. However, in
this country, it is not enough merely to make the judicial trains
run on time.35
Thus, the policies of finality and certainty do not justify an abso-
lute rule of juror incompetency. The importance of finality and
certainty is mitigated by competing policies and justifies only a
Probably there are not many cases in which each of the twelve jurors fully understands
and meticulously performs a juror's theoretical function, observing all its limitations
and fulfilling all its affirmative obligations. If all that went on in the jury room were
open to public and official scrutiny either most verdicts would fall or embarrassing
questions would be raised about the extent to which the law should openly tolerate and
sanction deviations from the conduct and the thought processes of the ideal juror.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d
Cir. 1947). "[I]t would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that no
verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and has based his
vote only upon evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a
hundred verdicts would stand such a test ... ." Id.
33 Rule 102 explicitly recognizes the importance of all these values to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, while ignoring the fact that the values are often in conflict.
34 See generally JAMES, JR., supra note 32, § 7.19. The author states:
The jury system can survive, however, despite frank recognition of its shortcomings. If
few verdicts actually reflect rigorously correct performance by every juror, then the
system should not be preserved by forcibly concealing that fact. The point is that the
system expresses the values of popular participation in the judicial process, a nontech-
nical view of the legal dispute shared by a group of lay persons, and giving effect to the
community's sense of what the law ought to be and sometimes is not.
Id. § 7.27 (footnote omitted).
35 See Thompson, supra note 28, at 1191, 1193. While the role of the jury as a check on
governmental tyranny was central to the inclusion of the right to jury trial in the Constitu-
tion, values such as accuracy and fairness seem to have become the focus of modern
Supreme Court decisions concerning the functioning of the jury. Id. The author states:
Community sense ofjustice, not truth, was the primary concern of our forefathers. The
main concerns about the inclusion of a right to jury trial in the Constitution stemmed
not from a fear that the judiciary would inaccurately enforce the law, but more from a
hope that a lay jury might choose not to enforce the law if the law were unjust or
offended the local community sense ofjustice.... Although the United States Supreme
Court has recognized the traditional role of the jury as a check on governmental tyr-
anny, recent decisions suggest a trend focusing on truth and accuracy as the predomi-
nant considerations in evaluating the role of the jury.
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partial rule of incompetency. The drafters and the courts have
recognized that Rule 606(b) was intended to embody a balance of
these competing policies. 6 Of course, exactly where the rule
draws the balance between competency and incompetency is not
altogether clear. Perfect fairness and accuracy is unattainable
and could be approached only at a prohibitive cost.37  But some
procedures employed by a jury to reach a verdict might be so fun-
36 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee's Note
admits that the rule reflects a balance between these policies. The Note states:
The values sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of deliber-
ation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and
embarrassment.... On the other hand, simply putting verdicts beyond effective reach
can only promote irregularity and injustice. The rule offers an accommodation between
these competing considerations.
Id. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1973). Rule 606(b) may be said to reflect two efforts to balance
competing policies. The rule first concludes that, in the usual case, the balance tips in favor
of policies which compel the juror witness to be silenced. See Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 807 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1987). The Peveto court explained:
Of course, in the jury trial process there is always some danger that jurors will misun-
derstand the law or consider improper factors in reaching their verdict, but, by imple-
menting Rule 606(b), Congress has made the policy decision that the social costs of
such error are outweighed by the need for finality to litigation, to protect jurors from
harassment after a verdict is rendered, and to prevent the possible exploitation of dis-
gruntled ex-jurors.
Id.; see also Maldonado v. Missouri P.R. Co., 798 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 932 (1987). The rule then concludes that there are exceptional cases where the
balance tips in the other direction. See State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d 686, 689-90 (Wis.
1984) (construing state version of Rule 606(b)). The Shillcutt court stated:
Important as the policies underlying jury secrecy are, there are situations where these
interests must give way to the competing interest in ensuring a fair trial and a just
resolution of the issues in the individual case. The statute accommodates the two op-
posing policies by making an exception to the general rule of incompetence for juror
testimony on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror.
Id. It is important to bear in mind that Rule 606(b) does not empower the courts to balance
these competing interests. That balance has already been struck by Congress. One promi-
nent judge urged Congress to not codify the law of juror competency and leave the issue to
the courts to resolve on a case-by-case basis. His advice was not heeded. See Hearings on
the Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Spec. Subcomm. on the Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 246, 250 (1973) (testi-
mony of Henry J. Friendly). On the other hand, it could be contended that the exceptions to
Rule 606(b) are broadly drafted and left undefined for the purpose of permitting the courts
discretion to balance in difficult cases. See Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d at 705 n.7 (Abrahamson,
J., dissenting) (there exists trend towards broadening exceptions to general rule that juror
cannot testify).
37 See Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 764 (1947). The Jorgensen court explained:
It would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that no verdict
shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and has based his vote
only upon evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a
hundred verdicts would stand such a test; and although absolute justice may require
as much, the impossibility of achieving it has induced judges to take a middle course,
for they have recognized that the institution could not otherwise survive.
Id.
134 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:125
damentally unfair and likely to produce inaccurate results, it can
be safely concluded that there is little reason to protect through
competency law the finality of the resulting verdict. For example,
under our theory of adjudication, we rely upon the adversary pro-
cess to uncover the truth by confronting the witnesses and the evi-
dence in open court. The opportunity to be heard by a fact-finder
that has not prejudged the case on extra-record evidence is essen-
tial to due process. Where a jury considers evidence or other mat-
ters that have not been heard in open court and thus, have not
been subject to adversarial challenge, the interests of accuracy
and fairness typically outweigh the value of finality. Similarly,
due process contemplates that decisionmaking be based on a ra-
tional evaluation of the evidence, not on some arbitrary process
like the flip of a coin.3 9 Thus, where the jury employs such an irra-
tional procedure, the value of finality is reduced and may be out-
weighed by competing values because of the manner in which the
decision in question was reached. This analysis makes some
sense of the exceptions for "extraneous prejudicial information"
and "outside influence," and suggests when Congress intended
those exceptions to be applicable.4 °
38 See Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1970). The court stated:
Judicial control of the juror[s'] knowledge of the case pursuant to the laws of evidence
is fundamental to the prevention of bias and prejudice. Our rules of evidence are
designed to exclude from consideration by the jurors those facts and objects which may
tend to prejudice or confuse. Evidence presented under the exclusionary rules is sub-
ject to cross-examination and rebuttal. It is therefore necessary that all evidence de-
veloped against an accused 'come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where
there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-exami-
nation, and of counsel."
Id. (quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965)); see, e.g., Parker v. Gladden,
385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (accused Sixth Amendment rights violated where bailiff engaged
in communications with jury relating to accused); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
137 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If the policy considera-
tions [supporting Rule 606(b)] seriously threaten the constitutional right to trial by a fair
and impartial jury, they must give way."); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523
F.2d 140, 149-51 (3d Cir. 1975) (rule prohibiting jury from impeaching verdict could not
constitutionally prevent disclosure of consideration by jury of news items concerning case,
extra-record facts, communications between third parties and jurors concerning the case,
and pressures or partiality on part of the court); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865,
867 (5th Cir. 1975) (court should have received juror's affidavit alleging that another juror
revealed extra-record facts concerning defendant during deliberations).
39 See generally In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) (Due
Process precludes trial by jury when jury is unable to reach verdict rationally due to com-
plexity of facts and issues). Of course, precluding trial by jury on the grounds the jury
cannot make a rational decision raises Seventh Amendment issues that are beyond the
scope of this essay.
40 See generally United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 1987) (Rule 606(b)
is intended to insure jurors will decide cases solely on basis of admitted evidence).
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Finally, restrictions on the competency of jurors to testify have
been justified on the grounds that such restrictions protect the
privacy of the jury's deliberations. 4' Of course, privacy in this con-
text is not necessarily a virtue. If the only point of privacy is to
give the jury freedom to engage in misconduct and perpetrate er-
ror without fear of discovery, privacy is not a policy to be valued.
In his famous treatise, John Henry Wigmore concluded that jury
privacy was essential because statements by jurors during delib-
erations were entitled to protection as privileged confidential com-
munications.42 Some relatively recent decisions expressly hold
that limits on juror competency are based on this privilege.4 3
Other cases, while not explicitly recognizing a privilege, rely on
reasoning typical of privilege analysis. These cases justify Rule
606(b) on grounds that the willingness of jurors to speak freely
during deliberations would be impaired without protection.44
This privilege analysis is an unconvincing explanation for the
law of juror incompetency. The holder of a privilege may customa-
rily waive it. However, nothing in the law of juror competency
suggests that juror willingness to testify is important.45 Moreover,
if the confidentiality of juror communications was worthy of pro-
tection under privilege law, that protection should extend gener-
ally to various proceedings. Instead, the law of juror competency
protects jury privacy only at a hearing into the validity of the
41 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915). "If evidence thus secured could be
thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the
constant subject of public investigation; to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference." Id.
42 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2346 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
43 See Bays v. Petan Co., 94 F.R.D. 587, 591 (D. Nev. 1982) (Rule 606(b) held to establish
privilege).
44 See In re Beverly Hills Fire, 695 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1982) (Rule 606(b) "ensures
that jurors will not feel constrained in their deliberations for fear of later scrutiny by
others.").
45 See Tanno v. S.S. President Madison, 830 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1987). In Tanno, the
entire jury voluntarily included on the verdict form explanations for answers given to spe-
cial interrogatories. Id. The statements were held to constitute an attempt to explain the
mental processes of the jury which must be disregarded under Rule 606(b). Id.; see also
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (court may not
inquire into jury's decisional process even when information is voluntarily given); Mauch v.
Manufacturer Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (N.D. 1984) (all jurors signed
affidavits concerning possible irregularities in jury proceedings and trial court held to have
improperly considered affidavits); Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681, 692 (N.D. 1964) (all 12
jurors signed affidavits stating that they believed defendant not guilty of gross negligence,
contrary to their verdict; court relied upon privilege analysis in holding affidavits could not
be received to show juror mental processes or reasoning).
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jury's decision.46
Maintaining jury privacy may be a legitimate policy goal of Rule
606(b) for a reason that the courts and commentators have never
explicitly developed. That reason has to do with the role of the
jury and its relationship to the judge and the law. The jury is the
courtroom embodiment of those democratic ideals central to
American social and political life. In theory, the jury is composed
of individuals reflecting a representative cross-section of the peo-
ple living in the community in which the case arises. 47 Those indi-
viduals are given the power to decide what values will control the
resolution of the case, even in the extreme instance when the
jury's values conflict with the law created by the legislature or the
courts and described by the judge in instructions.48 This power ex-
ists to advance community values, thus preventing legislatures
and the courts from fostering a morality of the elite.49
Rule 606(b) is justifiable as a means of protecting this power. If
jurors could be made to testify as to the thought processes that
formed the foundation of a verdict, then any exercise of their
power inconsistent with the values of the judge could be detected
46 Wigmore recognized the difficulties in characterizing the law of juror competency as
privilege. See WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2348.
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1968) ("No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the district courts of the United States ... on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status."); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86
(1942) ("[T]he officials charged with choosing federal jurors ... must not allow the desire
for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the concept of
the jury as a cross-section of the community."); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("It
is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that
the jury be a body truly representative of the community.").
48 See United States v. Powell, 936 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The concept of jury
nullification allows the jury to acquit the defendant even when the government has proven
its case beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th
Cir. 1979). The court held:
[A]fter jurors are armed with the Constitution and are aware of their power, they have
the final authority to acquit one of their fellow citizens accused of a crime that the
jurors do not consider to be a crime based on their consideration or determination of
the justice of the law. This is described as the jury's right of nullification .... [T]he
verdict of the jury cannot be challenged or retried or overturned by any higher court.
Id. at 236. See generally Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 CAL.
L. REV. 168 (1972); PAULA D. PERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 183 (1984).
49 See generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-103 (1970). The court held:
The purpose of the jury trial... is to prevent oppression by the Government. "Provid-
ing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased or eccentric judge.". . . Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obvi-
ously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the common
sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 100 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
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and controlled. Thus, protecting the privacy of the jury's collective
deliberations, as well as the individual juror's mental and emo-
tional processes, is essential to securing the role of the jury in our
system of justice. Absent some form of restriction on juror compe-
tency, "the result would be that every jury verdict would either
become the court's verdict or would be permitted to stand only by
the court's leave."5 °
While this analysis justifies some protection for jury privacy, it
does not go so far as to make an argument for a rule of absolute
incompetency. Instead, it identifies a policy basis for a partial
rule of incompetency while offering insight into the circumstances
where a juror should be allowed to impeach her verdict. The clear-
est case for permitting a juror to testify is where the policy rea-
sons for maintaining jury privacy are not pertinent. Thus, if the
reason to protect jury privacy is to permit the jury to express its
own values in a verdict, it should be clear that testimony may be
admitted to show that the verdict was influenced by bribery,
threats of violence, or other forces outside the jury.51 Such testi-
mony reveals the influence of matters that are unrelated to the
50 See United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1979). While the courts
have not developed this policy argument in the detail presented here, they have frequently
made general statements suggesting that the rule limiting juror competency is essential to
protecting the jury system. See United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887, 896 (2d Cir. 1987)
("open-ended inquiry into the questions considered by the jury and into the deliberations of
that jury will, if not kept on under very close check, undermine the entire nature and integ-
rity of our jury system"); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 581 (5th Cir. 1982) ("the ultimate
consequence of permitting the impeachment of jury verdicts by examination of the jurors'
hidden thoughts ... would destroy the effectiveness of the jury process which substantial
justice demands and the constitution guarantees."); Government of Virgin Islands v. Ger-
eau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[t]he rule was formulated to . . . [maintain] the
viability of the jury as a judicial decision making body."); see also Thompson, supra note 29,
at 1222. The author contends:
The interest in juror privacy is cited as an important consideration in the proper func-
tioning of the jury and has been relied on as justification for the limited competency of
jurors in post-trial hearings. Jurors must be free to engage in robust debate without
fearing governmental or public reprisals for the views expressed in the debate .... If
the essential role of the jury is to serve as a check on governmental tyranny in the
exercise of the laws, then the jurors must be free from governmental scrutiny and pos-
sible retaliation.
Id.
51 The courts generally permit jurors to testify to such matters on the grounds they are
covered by the exception for "outside influence." See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
117 (1986) ("[E]xceptions to the common law rule were recognized only in situations in
which 'extraneous influence' was alleged to have affected the jury." (citing Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892))); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954)
(trial court should have received juror testimony concerning whether jury foreman had
been influenced by bribery attempt); Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 566-70 (6th Cir.
1977) (threats to juror and family).
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internal values of the jury and, in fact, may undermine those
values.
Both the legislative history and language of Rule 606(b) affirm
the importance of this notion of privacy as a means of protecting
the jury's value choices from judicial scrutiny. Congress and the
drafters considered two versions of the rule. Both versions ren-
dered a juror incompetent to testify as to her mental processes or
the effect of anything on her mind or emotions.52 Protection of
such information is obviously essential to maintaining the privacy
of a juror's value judgments, which originate in the emotional and
mental realms. The version enacted into law went a step further,
protecting statements and other events occurring during delibera-
tions.53 This is also consistent with the privacy policy since that
policy would be ineffective if only the privacy of each individual
juror's thoughts was insulated from judicial inspection. Delibera-
tions reflect the collective thinking of the jury, which produces the
value choices underlying a verdict.54
52 See Preliminary Draft, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b), 46 F.R.D. 161, 289-90
(1969) (prohibiting juror from testifying as to mental process, this draft was silent as to
testimony relating to statements made during course of deliberations); Revised Draft, Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b), 51 F.R.D. 315, 386-87 (1971) (retained language with
respect to mental processes); Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 265
(1973) (substantial changes made in order to exclude a juror's testimony concerning any
matters or statements made during deliberations).
53 See supra note 4; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 108 (1987) (district
court did not err in its refusal to hold hearing in which jurors could testify with respect to
juror intoxication); United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 95-96 (3rd Cir. 1991) (not abuse
of discretion to refuse to order new trial based on affidavit by juror stating that plea bar-
gain had been brought to attention of jury); JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 68, at 95-96 (4th ed. 1992) ("Each juror has a privilege against the disclosure in court of
her communication to the other jurors during their retirement."); WIGMORE, supra note 42,
§ 2346, at 678. Communications among jurors are confidential. "[T]his confidence is essen-
tial to the due attachment of the jury's constitutional purpose .... [LInjury from disclosure
would certainly overbalance the benefits thereby gained .... [A] juror is [therefore] privi-
leged not to have his communications to a fellow juror disclosed." Id.
54 See WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2348, at 680 ("The verdict as finally agreed upon and
pronounced in court by jurors must be taken as the sole embodiment of the jury's act.
Hence, it stands irrespective of what led up to it in the privacy of the jury room .... "); see
also Note, Public Disclosure of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARv. L. REV. 886, 890 (1983) ("The
precise value of throwing together in a jury room a representative cross-section of the com-
munity is that a just consensus is reached through a thoroughgoing exchange of ideas and
impressions.").
On the other hand, it may be argued that prohibiting jurors from testifying as to events
that occur during deliberations has nothing to do with protecting the values underlying the
verdict. While it is easy to see why juror values would be revealed by testimony concerning
the mental or emotional processes of the juror, it is harder to understand how those values
might be revealed by testimony concerning, for example, the manner in which the jury
reached its verdict. The response to this argument is simply that the values underlying the
verdict often can be revealed not only by what the juror thinks, but also by what she says
and does.
JUROR COMPETENCY
Rule 606(b) as enacted created exceptions to juror incompe-
tency, permitting testimony as to whether "extraneous prejudicial
information" or "outside influence" affected the jury.55 The excep-
tion for "outside influence" gives support to this policy analysis,
which in turn provides a basis for interpreting the meaning of that
exception. Assume a juror testifies that someone off the jury of-
fered a bribe or made a threat. As described above, judicial scru-
tiny of such testimony does not offend policy since it is not the
jury's values that are scrutinized, but factors affecting the verdict
that are external to those values. Thus, something is an "outside
influence" when its revelation would not betray to the judge those
value judgments of the jury underlying its verdict. Likewise, tes-
timony exposing a verdict reached by flipping a coin or some other
completely arbitrary decisionmaking method would also be consid-
ered an "outside influence." Such testimony would not reveal jury
value judgments but, instead, the attempt to escape making such
judgments.
In summary, Rule 606(b) has two policy goals. First, finality
and certainty of judgment are pursued in order to conserve re-
sources. Second, the privacy of the jury's thought process is pro-
tected in order to insulate jury value judgments from judicial re-
view. Neither goal is an absolute. Privacy is abandoned when
jury value judgments are not in jeopardy. Finality and certainty
of judgment give way when jury misconduct raises very serious
issues of fairness and accuracy.
III. INTERPRETING RULE 606(b) IN LIGHT OF ITS POLICIES
When a jury employs racial bias in reaching a verdict, concern
for fairness and accuracy outweigh the policy goal of finality. Em-
ploying racial bias to reach a verdict is analogous to flipping a
coin. The verdict is no less arbitrary and irrational. Letting the
verdict go unchallenged would be a serious affront to notions of
equity. There is little societal value in protecting such a decision.
However, an argument based on the privacy policy still can be
made to support the prevailing assumption that Rule 606(b) pre-
cludes juror testimony concerning racial bias. As noted in the pre-
ceding section, the jury is in theory composed of individuals re-
55 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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flecting a representative cross section of the people living in the
community in which the case arises.56 Those individuals are given
the power to decide what values or biases will control the resolu-
tion of the case. This is true even in the extreme instance when
the jury's values conflict with the law created by the legislature
and described by the judge in instructions.57 Giving juries such
power can be justified on the grounds that it advances community
values, thus preventing legislatures and the courts from engaging
in oppression and fostering a morality of the elite.5 The admis-
sion of testimony concerning the effect of any bias on jury deci-
sionmaking would undermine this power. If jurors could be made
to testify as to the biases that formed the foundation of a verdict,
the exercise of their power inconsistent with the biases or values
of the judge could be detected and controlled.
But a deeper policy analysis reveals a serious problem in using
Rule 606(b) to exclude juror testimony of jury racial bias. As
noted above, the very purpose of protecting jury privacy is to per-
mit the jury to control the inclinations of the legislature and the
courts to abuse their powers by engaging in oppression and foster-
ing the values of a small elite. But democratic institutions like the
jury system can themselves produce oppression when the majority
uses its values to demean the rights of minorities.59 If the jury
supplants the judge as a source of oppression, the justification for
the jury system is undermined and both the need and desirability
of protecting jury decisions through evidence law are diminished.
Thus, where a verdict is animated by bias in the form of racial,
ethnic, or other prejudice against a minority group, it may make
sense from a policy standpoint to permit exposure of that bias.
Three arguments can be advanced in opposition to this conten-
tion. First, if it is conceded that the judge may invade the privacy
of the jury to search for the use of a value such as racial prejudice,
then the exercise of jury nullification based on any value is in
jeopardy. If the judge discovers the verdict was not based on ra-
cial prejudice but employs another value inconsistent with the let-
ter of the law, the judge might use that inconsistency as a basis to
56 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
57 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
58 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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overturn the verdict. Thus, the search for racial bias could be em-
ployed as a pretense for reviewing the jury's use of other less of-
fensive values and admitting evidence thereof. But like most
"slippery slope" arguments, it loses momentum if the specific case
can be distinguished from the general rule. There are sound pol-
icy reasons to draw a bright line permitting courts to consider
under Rule 606(b) evidence of racial bias while excluding evidence
of other biases. American jurisprudence has for decades treated
racial bias differently from other biases. Eradication of the evil of
state-supported racial prejudice is at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 0 More than a century after adoption of that provi-
sion, racial prejudice remains arguably the most significant social
problem in the nation. Trial procedures which remain oblivious to
racial sensibilities run the risk of seriously exacerbating that
problem. Since Rule 606(b) recognizes exceptions to its general
rule of exclusion, it is clear that the provision contemplates a bal-
ance between the values promoted by exclusion and those under-
mined thereby. While the balance may be difficult to strike in
many cases, it should be clear that the costs of excluding evidence
of racial bias under Rule 606(b) are generally greater than the
costs of admitting such evidence.
A second objection to admitting evidence of jury racial bias
might be based on the fact there is legislative history suggesting
that Rule 606(b) does not permit juror testimony regarding any
bias. An influential Senator played a significant part in the draft-
ers' final selection among the competing draft versions of Rule
606(b). Senator McClellan specifically cautioned the Advisory
Committee against proposing a version of the Rule that would per-
mit jurors to testify as to the role of bias in the verdict.6 1 However,
60 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986) ("[W]e reaffirm our conviction
that discrimination on the basis of race in the selection of grand jurors 'strikes at the fun-
damental values of our judicial system and our society as a whole.'" (quoting Rose v. Mitch-
ell, 443 U.S. 545, 553 (1979))); Rose, 443 U.S. at 554 (respondents indicted for murder
sought dismissal on grounds that jury foreman was selected in racially discriminatory
manner); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 87 (1955) (indictment of defendant by jury from
which members of his race have been systematically excluded is denial of equal protection);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (racial discrimination which results in exclusion
from jury service violates Constitution and basic concepts of a democratic society); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (concerns about racial discrimination was "in-
ducement to bestow upon the national government the power to enforce the provision that
no state shall deny ... the equal protection of the laws.").
61 See 117 CoNG. REC. 33642, 33645 (1971) (letter from Senator McClellan). The Senator
stated:
I have no objection to permitting jurors to testify that improper information came to
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it is also true that the entire Congress endorsed the notion that
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be construed in a manner to
"secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."6 2 Growth and development occurs
when the law changes to meet the evolving needs of society. Cur-
rent events suggest a pressing need to promote respect for our
laws and judicial system by avoiding procedures that are associ-
ated with racial bias.
A final objection to the interpretation of Rule 606(b) advocated
here is that it may be difficult to justify admitting testimony con-
cerning racial bias under the language of the exceptions in Rule
606(b). Bias might not qualify as an "outside influence" since it is
imposed as a factor in decisionmaking by the jury itself, not some
source extrinsic to the jury. 3 On the other hand, bias may be con-
sidered an outside influence if what is meant by that term is an
influence on the verdict "outside" of the record and the parameters
of constitutionally acceptable values which the jury may use in its
deliberations.14 Similarly, bias may not look like "extraneous prej-
udicial information" since, while bias is arguably "extraneous" and
certainly "prejudicial," it is hard to think of it as "information."65
their attention .... Were it possible to overturn a decision because, in fact, it was not
based on precedent, but bias, and this was an issue that could be litigated, it would
indeed be brought before the courts. Present law, as I read it, wisely prohibits this sort
of inquiry....
Id.
62 FED. R. EVID. 102.
63 See, e.g., Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) (testimony
regarding subjective prejudices or improper motives of individual jurors within prohibition
of Rule 606(b) rather than within exception for "extraneous influences"); United States v.
Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1980) (no evidence of any external influence on members
of the jury, prejudice complained of is product of unrelated personal experiences); Simmons
First Nat'l Bank v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.R.D. 344, 345 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (jurors' own
prejudices or experiences do not constitute external influences); Smith v. Brewer, 444 F.
Supp. 482, 489 (S.D. Iowa) (juror's racist comments and gestures during deliberations do
not reflect outside influence), affd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1978); State v. Shillcutt, 350
N.W.2d 686, 690 (Wis. 1984) (statement of juror during deliberations evidencing racial
prejudice was not an outside influence).
64 See Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290-91 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). In Tobias, a juror
submitted an affidavit stating that, during deliberations, the jury foreman had said: "You
can't tell one black from another," and another juror had suggested that the jury should
take the word of the white victims over the black defendant. Id. at 1289-90. The court ruled
that the affidavit may be received under Rule 606(b) since "the statements in the juror's
affidavit are sufficient to raise a question as to whether the jury's verdict was discolored by
improper influences. . . ." Id.
65 See, e.g., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 581 (5th Cir. 1982) (juror's letter to judge
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On the other hand, if bias manifests itself in the form of comments
made by jurors during deliberations to sway other jurors, the com-
ments may be thought of as the functional equivalent of informa-
tion even though not presented in the form of hard data.6
CONCLUSION
Justice mandates that the law be color blind. But this means
that the law should neither provide favor nor impose disadvan-
tage based upon race. It does not follow that the law must be
blind to its effect on the racial problems that beset society. If em-
ployed to exclude evidence that a verdict was rooted in racial bias,
Rule 606(b) could exacerbate racial problems. Process values like
finality of judgment are not substantially advanced by excluding
such evidence. While it may be true that the privacy of the jury is
compromised by admitting this evidence, the social cost of protect-
ing that privacy has become too high.
revealing juror's prejudices did not constitute extraneous prejudicial information since it
did not reveal presence of any extrinsic material improperly placed before jury); Shillcutt v.
Gagnon, 602 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (Wis. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (juror's
remark was neither "extraneous" nor "information" but an expression of racial stereotype);
Brewer, 444 F. Supp. at 489 (juror's racist comments and gestures during deliberations did
not impart information); Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d at 690 (statements ofjuror exhibiting racial
prejudice did not constitute extraneous prejudicial information).
66 See, e.g., Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d at 700 (Steinmetz, J., concurring) (statements of juror
exhibiting racial prejudice should be considered extraneous prejudicial information); After
Hour Welding Inc. v. Laneil Management Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Wis. 1982) (juror com-
petent to testify as to anti-semitic statements made by other jurors concerning defendant's
witness since they were "extraneous prejudicial information"); see also Thompson, supra
note 28, at 1204. The author noted:
Presumably any information that is used by the jurors to decide the case could be clas-
sified as extraneous if it did not come from the admitted evidence and the juror's gen-
eral knowledge. To the extent that the juror's decision is based in all or part on a
particular predisposition toward a party's race, age, sex, facial hair, economic status,
personal belief about facts not introduced into evidence, or improper understanding of
the law, the verdict would appear to be based on prejudicial information or outside
influence.... Nonetheless, the legislative history urges a more restrictive reading of
the language, but no clear definition is given.
Id.

